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THE RESURGENCE OF EXECUTIVE PRIMACY  
IN THE AGE OF POPULISM:  
INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM 
Peter Cane* 
At the end of the twentieth century, after a hundred years of large-scale 
wars, major financial crashes, and the rise and fall of fascist, Nazi, and 
communist ideologies, Francis Fukuyama asked the question whether the 
process of political development in the “West” that had begun, (let us say for 
the sake of argument) in seventeenth-century England, had culminated in the 
global establishment of liberal democracy as the gold standard for human 
social organisation.1 In his latest book,2 Fukuyama interprets the election of 
Donald Trump as U.S. President, and the Brexit referendum vote in the United 
Kingdom in favour of leaving the European Union, as signs that the question 
must (for the moment, anyway) be answered in the negative. The problem, as 
he sees it, is that while “[m]odern liberal democracies promise and largely 
deliver a minimal degree of equal respect, embodied in individual rights, rule 
of law, and the franchise . . . [this] does not guarantee . . . that people in a 
democracy will be equally respected in practice, particularly members of 
groups with a history of marginalisation.”3 Fukuyama argues that such 
practical “demands for equal recognition . . . are unlikely to ever be 
completely fulfilled.”4 This, in turn, creates space for political actors to 
exploit “common” people’s realisation of and dissatisfaction, with liberal 
democracy’s inability to realise “practical” equality, in order to gain power 
by undermining and exploiting the very mechanisms through which liberal 
democracy delivers its “minimal degree of equal respect.”  
Put bluntly, the point is that although democracy may be reasonably 
good at delivering liberty, it is much less good, in combination with its 
economic corollary, a free-market economy, at delivering material equality. 
This gap between the promise and the reality tends to generate conflict that 
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“populist” politicians can exploit, for their own aggrandisement, to justify 
“executive primacy” or even dictatorship. Fukuyama’s suggested 
prophylactics against such negative outcomes are “more universal 
understandings of human dignity.”5 
The articles in this issue, devoted to legal and constitutional issues 
around executive primacy and populism, were first presented at an Advanced 
Workshop on the Resurgence of Executive Primacy in the Age of Populism, 
organised by Professor Cheng-Yi Huang and held at the Institutum 
Jurisprudentiae of the Academica Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan on June 21 and 22, 
2018. Scholarly interest in populism has grown over the past thirty years to 
the point where it could recently be the subject of The Oxford Handbook of 
Populism, published late in 2017. According to the editors of that volume, the 
bulk of scholarly analysis of populism since 1990 (outside the United States, 
at least) has been undertaken by political scientists. Some legal scholars have 
written about what we might call “popular constitutionalism,” which can be 
understood as referring to the theoretical and legal framework of liberal 
democracy. So far, however, public lawyers have not shown a great deal of 
interest in what we might call “populist constitutionalism,” which can be 
thought of as the theoretical and legal framework of “populism,” understood 
as a pathology of liberal democracy. The Taipei workshop was designed to 
encourage lawyers to think more carefully about legal tools, expressions, and 
implications of populism, if only because “the devil you know is easier to live 
and deal with than the devil you don’t.” 
Political accounts and legal analyses of phenomena such as populism 
can be linked by thinking of public law as providing a rule-based 
(“normative”) framework for the practice of politics. Put differently, public 
law is concerned with the formal recognition of public, political power, its 
allocation, exercise, and control. For present purposes, we may think of 
politics as being primarily concerned with distribution of resources and, in 
that guise, as being embedded in normative principles of distributive justice 
(which may, or may not, have legal foundations). The main categories of 
public law are constitutional law, administrative law, and international law. 
Whereas international law frames relations between (“inter”), above (“supra”) 
and across (“trans”) nation-states, the concepts of constitutional law and 
administrative law structure public law at all levels—sub-national, national, 
international, supra-national, and transnational. In very crude terms, 
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constitutional law is conceptualised as dealing with large-scale “structural” or 
“architectural” issues of politics, while administrative law deals with the 
smaller-scale, quotidian engineering of governance. As a moment’s reflection 
on the Trump Presidency and the Brexit referendum will confirm, the 
constitutional and the administrative, the national, international, supra-
national, and transnational, are all linked to one another in complex webs of 
interaction and influence. 
The term “populist constitutionalism” may strike the reader as a 
contradiction in terms. After all, from one point of view, populism involves 
misuse and abuse of the mechanisms of (popular) constitutionalism. 
However, if a constitution is defined as a legal framework for the conduct of 
politics, and if it is accepted (as it universally is) that law partly constitutes 
such a framework, populism and constitutionalism are “not necessarily in 
contradiction.”6 Jan-Werner Mueller argues that although, outside 
government, populists may seek to navigate a course through or around the 
constitutional strictures of liberal democracy, once in power, they will seek to 
put in place new constitutional frameworks that will facilitate and legitimate 
their continuation in office. In other words, populists and authoritarians are 
not against constitutionalism in the sense of conduct of politics within and 
according to a framework of legal rules. Nor do they necessarily seek power 
by unconstitutional means. On the contrary, they may use constitutionalism 
to their own advantage, to facilitate and support stronger government than is 
generally thought compatible with liberal democratic principles, with the 
professed aim of achieving outcomes that liberal democracy has proved 
unable to deliver. 
It is with the interaction between populist politics and executive 
primacy on the one hand, and the constitutional and legal frameworks of 
governance on the other, that the papers in this Symposium are primarily 
concerned. In his paper, Gábor Attila Tóth maintains that constitutionalism 
may be understood as resting on an equilibrium between two theoretical 
conceptions of government: a Hobbesian conception based on trust in 
government and a Lockean conception based on distrust. The Hobbesian 
conception facilitates and justifies strong government, while the Lockean 
conception favours limited government. Tóth suggests that populism and 
authoritarianism may be a product of a transition from one equilibrium to 
another. The populist deploys the legal and constitutional tools of one 
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equilibrium to gain power and, once in office, uses those tools to engineer a 
new equilibrium within which executive power can be aggrandised and 
perpetuated. 
This sort of (non-r)evolutionary process of to-ing and fro-ing between 
equilibria of political power is explored by Mauro Hiane de Moura with 
reference to the recent history of Brazil. De Moura identifies two levers, for 
concentration of power and authoritarianism, that have been particularly 
salient in Brazil. One is the relationship between the executive and the 
bureaucracy. This is a key dimension of the allocation of public power in the 
modern world of large, active, and positive governments. Depending on other 
features of the design of the governmental system, either a relatively closer 
relationship between executive and bureaucracy (as in the United Kingdom) 
or a more distant relationship (as in the United States) may be compatible with 
the realisation of “liberal democratic” ideals. On the other hand, in 
presidential systems, centralisation of control of the bureaucracy within the 
office of the president is a common tool of and path to authoritarianism. 
Another lever of power-concentration is the economic system. Political 
liberalism (democracy) is typically associated with economic, free-market 
liberalism. Economic liberalism requires that economic policy be driven by 
“technical” and efficiency-based economic theory, implemented by agencies 
relatively independent of “politics.” By contrast, populist and authoritarian 
regimes, whether “left-wing” or “right-wing,” are often committed to 
centralised distribution or redistribution of resources according to criteria 
other than economic efficiency. The two levers are related in the sense that 
executive control of economic policy involves “politicisation”  
of the bureaucracy. 
The relationship between the executive and the bureaucracy is 
commonly not expressly regulated by codified constitutions. This may enable 
populists and authoritarians to manipulate the relationship to their own 
advantage within the pre-existing constitutional framework, without acting 
unconstitutionally. Drawing on illustrations from Japan, Taiwan, and Poland, 
Cheng-Yi Huang discusses the use of what he calls “unenumerated powers.” 
Unenumerated powers are executive powers not expressly conferred by the 
constitution but established by political usage (“conventions of the 
constitution” in English constitutional terminology). They may include 
powers to appoint, monitor, and dismiss bureaucrats, to coordinate policy-
making activities, and to control a political party. Unenumerated powers are 
generally found to be essential for efficient and effective day-to-day 
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government, but their limits tend to be ill-defined, and courts may be 
unwilling or unable to control their use by authoritarians to concentrate and 
centralise power. 
In her study of the history of the relationship between the political 
executive and the appointed bureaucracy in Japan, especially in the last 
hundred years, Mayu Terada illustrates the dynamics of the bureaucratic 
appointment power in a multi-party system in which one political party holds 
the reins of government for a long period. She explores reforms designed to 
de-politicise the appointment process and to strengthen the role of 
technocratic voices in the policy-making process. 
Anya Bernstein takes a very different approach to the same topic. She 
sets out to discover how bureaucrats in Taiwan and the United States 
respectively understand their positions and roles in government and their 
relationships with the executive, other organs of government, and the general 
population. Her most general finding is that U.S. bureaucrats position 
themselves predominantly vis-à-vis the executive, whereas Taiwanese 
bureaucrats see themselves as interacting within a wider and more diverse 
circle including, for instance, the legislature and citizens. Bernstein suggests 
that the openness of Taiwanese bureaucrats to outside influences may be less 
congenial to, and more obstructive, of populism than the more executive 
mentality of U.S. bureaucrats. 
Whereas codified constitutions typically say relatively little about the 
executive and bureaucracy, they usually spell out in some detail the procedure 
for amending the constitution, which usually makes it more difficult for any 
one institution or group to control the amendment process than it is to control 
the normal processes for making non-constitutional law. This may make it 
harder for politicians to achieve and exercise constituent power to their own 
advantage. Maciej Bernatt and Michal Ziólkowski provide a vivid account of 
the use of a technique that they call “statutory anti-constitutionalism” in 
Poland in recent years. This is a process by which, without formally amending 
the constitution and without following the constitutionally-specified 
amendment procedures, a government can use a parliamentary majority 
effectively to amend the constitution by ordinary law-making procedure, and 
protect those amendments from challenge by cutting off avenues of recourse 
to the courts. Just as reducing the “independence” of bureaucrats is a 
commonly-used tool for concentrating political power, so is reducing the 
independence of, or disabling, the judiciary. 
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According to Fukuyama, populist authoritarianism is a disease of 
liberal democracy contracted as a result of its inability to meet popular 
aspirations for both liberty and equality. His suggested cure is that we redefine 
what it means for human beings to be equal. This is a vague and daunting 
prescription. In the final article in the Symposium, I take a somewhat less 
ambitious and more concrete tack. As the articles in this Symposium suggest, 
populism and authoritarianism present ongoing challenges not only to liberal 
democracy but also to its legal underpinnings. Manipulation, avoidance, 
evasion, and outright rejection of the constitutional and legal frameworks of 
liberal democracy are features of much populist authoritarianism. My basic 
argument is that liberal-democratic public law and legal theory no longer 
reflect human needs and desires because they were conceived, born, and grew 
up in worlds that no longer exist, when the main pre-occupation was to secure 
liberty, not equality—when inequality was taken for granted and the most 
immediate threat appeared to be absolute authoritarian rule. Now many people 
want constitutions, laws, and government that strike a different balance 
between liberty and equality in a time when human beings are more aware 
than ever before of their interdependence and the importance of concerted 
action to our future well-being and even survival. The modest aim of my 
article is to explain the inherited structure of our public law and theory, and 
the main changes that have brought us to the position where it may be thought 
to no longer mirror politics. 
The hope of all the contributors to this Symposium is that it might 
challenge lawyers to think more carefully and constructively about the 
specifically constitutional and legal aspects of the political phenomena of 
executive primacy and populism. We need to understand the disease (however 
that be defined) before attempting a cure. Otherwise, we risk killing the 
patient, or feeding the cancer, rather than preventing its spread. 
 
 
